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1 Introduction
A vast body of evidence documents that limitations in self-control, memory, and attention
may lead people to act against their long-run self interest (see Rabin 1999 and DellaVigna
2009 for comprehensive reviews of the literature). These ndings have spurred the interest
in how subtle changes in choice architectures can improve `Decisions About Health, Wealth,
and Happiness' (Thaler and Sunstein 2008). Choice-preserving changes in seemingly minor
institutional details { nudges { hold the promise to help some people avoid making mistakes
without distorting choices of others. Examples of nudges that have been shown to strongly
aect decisions include the specication of default options, information disclosure policies, or
the framing and labeling of policy interventions (e.g., Johnson and Goldstein 2003, Wisdom
et al. 2010, Abeler and Marklein 2010).
In this paper, we study whether simple reminder messages can be used as a nudge to
encourage dental health prevention. Preventive health care constitutes a potential hot spot
for biases in people's decisions. Activities such as screenings and routine check-ups should be
conducted regularly but at a relatively low frequency. As a consequence, these key elements of
eective health prevention are vulnerable to limitations in memory and attention: people may
simply forget about scheduling the next check-up. Moreover, investments in prevention typi-
cally entail short-run costs but yield benets only in the long-run. Present-biased preferences
may thus lead people to procrastinate their next check-up. Finally, people might under-invest
in preventive health care because they are not fully aware of its future benets. Reminders
about preventive activities represent a low-cost and unobtrusive intervention in that they let
people schedule their check-ups whenever they want to. A person who rationally postpones a
check-up can thus just ignore the reminder message. Someone who would otherwise delay a
check-up due to memory limitations or other biases, however, might benet from receiving a
reminder.
In cooperation with a German dentist, we implemented a eld experiment to examine the
impact of reminders on the frequency of dental check-ups. Regular check-ups are associated
with improved periodontal health and ensure that oral diseases are discovered early { which
typically makes treatment less painful and less costly (e.g., Lang et al. 1994). In addition,
healthy teeth yield economic returns (Glied and Neidell 2010). To identify the causal eect
of reminders, we exogenously vary whether people are reminded to schedule a new check-up
appointment. Within the group of people who receive a reminder, we additionally randomize
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the content of the reminder messages. In particular, we vary whether the reminder includes a
paragraph that informs patients about the benets of prevention. We also randomize whether
this information is framed positively or negatively, as it is predominantly the case with health
warning messages for tobacco and other potentially harmful products.
We nd that reminders cause a substantial increase in the number of check-ups. Within
one month after receiving a reminder, the fraction of people who contact the dentist and
schedule a check-up appointment is more than twice as high as in our control group (19.3%
vs. 8.9%). Similarly, the fraction of patients who visit the dentist and have a check-up is
more than 10 percentage points higher in the treated group. The magnitude of the reminder
eect is remarkably persistent over time. Even 100 days after the intervention, the fraction of
patients who scheduled a check-up is roughly 8 percentage points higher in the treated group
(33.8% vs. 26.0%). Reminders thus encourage people to engage more strongly in dental health
prevention.
In contrast to the strong overall impact of being reminded, the specic type and content
of the reminder seems to matter relatively little. In particular, adding information about
the benets of prevention does not signicantly increase patients' response rates relative to a
neutral reminder. We also nd no systematic dierences in responses to a positive or negative
framing of the reminders' content. These results hold for a broad range of patient subgroups
and are robust, for instance, to controlling for individual dierences in age, gender, and check-
up history.
We also analyze how people behave when they are repeatedly exposed to reminders. Over
the course of our experiment, several patients are treated twice as they are due for a further
check-up. Our randomization procedure ensures that we obtain random treatment sequences,
in terms of whether and how a person is reminded the rst and second time she is up for a
check-up. Our data show that patients who receive multiple reminders exhibit similar response
patterns as patients who receive the rst reminder in our experiment. At the same time, we
nd no detrimental eects if one stops sending a reminder at the second check-up date.
A number of previous studies used eld experiments to analyze the eects of reminders
in the context of health decisions (e.g., McDowell et al. 1989, Macharia et al. 1992, O'Keefe
and Jensen 2009, Milkman et al. 2011, Calzolari and Nardotto 2014), as well as in other
economically relevant settings such as loan repayment (e.g., Cadena and Schoar 2011, Karlan
et al. 2012), saving (e.g., Kast et al. 2012, Karlan et al. 2013), or rule compliance (e.g.,
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Apesteguia et al. 2013). Table A.1 in the appendix provides an overview of the setup and key
results of these studies. Our paper contributes to the existing literature in several dimensions.
First, by varying the content and framing of reminder messages, we provide new insights on
the mechanisms through which reminders aect behavior. Overall, our results indicate that
reminders increase the number of check-ups primarily because they raise patients' attention
and attenuate potential delays due to memory limitations. In contrast, limited awareness
about the benets of prevention seems to matter relatively little, as providing information on
these benets does not increase response rates relative to a neutral reminder. These results
augment the evidence from other studies that have explored alternative channels through
which reminders might aect behavior, such as habit formation (Calzolari and Nardotto 2014),
monitoring (Kast et al. 2012, Karlan et al. 2012), or the provision of precisely dened goals,
rules, and incentives (Karlan et al. 2013, Apesteguia et al. 2013).
Second, for the domain of dental health, the existing randomized trials have exclusively
focused on the question whether reminders inuence patients' attendance at pre-arranged
appointments for orthodontic surgery and related treatments (Reekie and Devlin 1998, Can
et al. 2003, Bos et al. 2005). These studies have found mixed evidence on the eectiveness
of reminders in reducing the frequency of broken appointments. In contrast, we show that
reminders signicantly increase patients' responses and check-up rates in a preventive-health
setting where people are reminded about the need to schedule new dental check-ups.
Third, our extensive set of sociodemographic characteristics allows us to derive nuanced in-
sights on whether certain groups of people are especially responsive to reminders, and whether
particular types of reminders have stronger eects for some subgroups. This is of high practi-
cal relevance from a public policy perspective and might shed further light on why particular
groups of people respond to reminders. Our analysis shows that simple nudges tend to work
best for a wide range of people: the neutral reminder message triggers the highest response
rate among almost all groups of patients. In fact, a uniform neutral reminder might be prefer-
able to the costly targeting of specic groups with dierent reminder nudges. This is the case,
as framed reminders sometimes backre and erode the positive reminder eect in certain sub-
groups (e.g., for patients with painful treatment experiences in the past). At the same time,
our evidence points to a potentially important role of personal costs in explaining dierential
responses to reminders. For instance, patients with private health insurance plans, who typ-
ically face higher costs of making check-ups, hardly respond to any of the reminders. This
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complements ndings from other papers that have compared the eectiveness of reminders to
alternative interventions that directly vary the explicit or implicit incentives for carrying out
a task (e.g., Cadena and Schoar 2011, Kast et al. 2012).
Finally, our paper provides a systematic evaluation of repeated treatment interventions
in the context of reminders.1 Other studies of recurrent reminder systems (e.g., Apesteguia
et al. 2013, Karlan et al. 2013, or Calzolari and Nardotto 2014) have either focused primarily
on overall treatment eects or kept the treatment assignment constant for a given participant.
In contrast, we study treatment sequences that randomly vary both the incidence of being
reminded and the type of reminder received. The data from these treatment sequences indicate
that applying reminders repeatedly neither strengthens nor weakens their eects. Importantly,
we also observe no detrimental eect for patients who do not receive a reminder after having
received one in the previous check-up interval. The response rate of such patients still lies
above the one of a control group that remained untreated in both periods. This indicates that
reminders do not crowd out people's active choices once the nudge is taken away { a concern
that has frequently been raised by critics of libertarian paternalistic interventions (e.g., Rizzo
and Whitman 2009).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the following section, we rst give an
overview of the institutional context and the treatments of our experiment. We then introduce
a simple theoretical framework to illustrate how dierent biases shape patients' decisions to
have check-ups, and how our reminders might aect these decisions. In Section 3, we describe
the implementation of the experiment. Section 4 presents our empirical results and Section 5
concludes.
2 Dental health prevention, check-ups, and reminders
Health prevention is a non-trivial inter-temporal problem. In the case of dental health, brush-
ing one's teeth regularly, ossing, and avoiding sugary food is costly today { in terms of time,
eort, and foregone pleasure. Such investments, however, potentially generate high returns
through improved future health. In addition to health-related payos, healthy teeth may also
yield higher wages (Glied and Neidell 2010) and other benets associated with beauty (e.g.,
Mocan and Tekin 2010, Belot et al. 2012).
1Further evidence on the long-run eects of repeated treatments in the context of energy-conservation
policies and interventions to increase charitable giving is provided by Allcott and Rogers (2014) as well as
Landry et al. (2010) and Adena et al. (2014), respectively.
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A key factor in dental health prevention are routine check-ups. These ensure that oral
diseases are discovered early, which typically makes treatment less painful and less costly
(e.g., Lang et al. 1994). Recommendations for check-up intervals vary between three months
and more than a year, depending on patients' risk factors and dental health status (see, e.g.,
National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence 2004). In Germany, the recommended
check-up interval for healthy patients is six months. At-risk groups (e.g., diabetes mellitus
patients who face increased parodontitis risks) are recommended more frequent check-ups.2
Acknowledging the importance of dental prevention, many health care providers use economic
incentives to encourage regular check-ups. Patients covered by the German public health
insurance (more than 80% of our sample), for instance, are eligible for free dental check-ups
and receive a 20% [30%] allowance on treatment costs if they had at least one check-up per
year for the last 5 [10] years.3
In our setup, there are two steps to a check-up. First, a patient has to contact her dentist
to schedule an appointment. While this entails only trivial costs, a patient has to remember
to contact her dentist when a new check-up is due.4 Second, once a date for the check-up
is arranged, the patient has to keep the appointment and go to the dentist, which involves
transaction and opportunity costs (e.g., from traveling to the dentist).
Fully rational patients who trade o their personal costs and benets of prevention will
attend check-ups at an individually optimal frequency. However, a growing body of research
suggests that some people may be prone to make sub-optimal decisions in the context of health
prevention (e.g., Loewenstein et al. 2007, Thaler and Sunstein 2008, Oullier et al. 2010). In
the case of routine check-ups, there are three main factors that can cause delays in check-ups.
First, people might not have the task of making a new check-up appointment on the `top of
their minds' because of limitations in memory and attention. Second, people might not be
fully aware of the future benets of check-ups, e.g., because they underestimate the risk and
2There is an ongoing debate about best practices for check-up intervals in dentistry. The debate reects
a lack of causal evidence on how dierent intervals aect long-run health outcomes (see, e.g., Mettes 2005).
Motivated by the missing evidence, a large-scale randomized trial on dierent check-up intervals has recently
been launched in the UK (see https://viis.abdn.ac.uk/HSRU/Interval/).
3 Private health insurance contracts are more heterogenous. Generally, the incentives to regularly attend
check-ups are typically weaker than in the public insurance system. In addition, the costs for check-ups tend
to be higher for privately insured patients.
4Some dentists assign a date for the next check-up already at the previous appointment. With this proce-
dure, it is less important to remember when to arrange a new appointment. It is crucial, however, to keep in
mind the date of the future, pre-arranged appointment.
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cost of future treatments. Finally, the short-run costs associated with check-ups might lead
present-biased people to delay their check-ups.
Depending on their content, reminder messages may work against all of these biases. At
the same time, reminders preserve patients' freedom to schedule check-ups whenever they want
to. Those who rationally postpone check-ups (e.g., because of high opportunity costs) can
thus simply ignore the reminders. In what follows, we rst describe the reminder messages
that we implemented in our experiment. We then present a simple theoretical framework
to illustrate how memory limitations, limited awareness, and present biases aect people's
propensity to schedule check-ups, and how reminders may inuence their behavior.
2.1 Treatments
We examine a nested experimental design with two layers of randomization. First, we exoge-
nously vary whether individuals who should make a new check-up according to their recom-
mended check-up interval receive a reminder postcard. Second, within the treated group we
randomize design, content, and framing of the reminder postcards. Overall, we consider six
dierent treatments (an overview of the treatments is presented in Figure 1). The group of
patients who receive no reminder (No-Reminder) serves as our main control group. Patients
in treatment Neutral receive a reminder postcard that asks to make a new check-up appoint-
ment. In addition, the postcard provides the dentist's name, phone number, and address.
This content is also included in all further reminder treatments, which contain additional in-
formation about the benets of dental health prevention. Two treatments provide positively
framed information that emphasizes the long-run health benets as well as potential pecuniary
advantages due to prevention. The nal two treatments provide the same information, but
the text stresses the negative consequences of not taking care of dental health (see Table A.2
in the appendix).
Together with the text manipulations we vary the cover design of the postcards (see Fig-
ure A.1 in the appendix). The neutral postcard displays a picture of a calendar, with the
word `Dentist' written on one of the dates. In the positively framed treatments, the postcard
shows either a smiling female or male face with healthy teeth (treatments PosF and PosM ,
respectively). In the treatments with negative framing of information, the cover displays a
female or male patient with toothache (NegF , NegM).
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Figure 1: Overview of treatments.
2.2 Decision framework
Before discussing how our treatments might aect patients' behavior, we rst sketch a patient's
check-up problem in a simple three-period framework. In t0, the patient decides whether she
calls the dentist to schedule a check-up for t1.
5 Conditional on having arranged a check-up,
she chooses whether or not to actually attend the appointment in t1. In the nal period,
t2, health outcomes are realized; the net benets from having attended a check-up in t1 are
denoted by H  0.6
Consider rst the patient's decision in t1. Conditional on having arranged an appointment,
the patient attends the check-up in this period if the costs of doing so are smaller than the
perceived net benets of the check-up:
c1  c^1 := H: (1)
5In line with the institutional setting of the experiment, we do not allow for spontaneous check-ups.
6H is a short-cut to capture the expected net present value (in t2) of all future benets that result from
the check-up in t1. H might be specic to individuals and depends, among others, on baseline risk factors
and check-up history. A more general analysis, which is beyond the scope of this paper, would also consider
the optimal timing of check-ups and the impact of dierent check-up frequencies on health outcomes.
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c1 denotes the realization of the patient's (stochastic) attendance costs, which include the costs
of traveling to the dentist, opportunity costs, fear, etc. The parameter , with 0    1,
captures the possibility that a patient may not be fully aware of the future benets of the
check-up. A patient who is partially unaware thus bases her attendance decision on the
perceived benets, H, instead of the true benets H. Furthermore, the patient discounts
future benets at rate , where 0 < ;   1 measure the patient's time preferences and a
potential present bias ( < 1), respectively.
Let c1 be drawn from a c.d.f. F (:) that has full support over [0; c1]. The patient's attendance
probability is then given by F (c^1). Conditional on having arranged an appointment for t1, a
patient who is fully aware of the future health consequences ( = 1) and exhibits no present
bias ( = 1) will thus attend the check-up with probability F (H). Limited awareness and
present bias have qualitatively similar eects on the patient's attendance probability. They
both reduce the decision-relevant level of perceived benets, resulting in a lower attendance
probability of F (H)  F (H) (conditional on having arranged an appointment).
Now turn to t0 where the patient decides whether or not to call her dentist for scheduling
an appointment. At this stage, a patient might be aected by limitations in memory and
attention. Given that check-ups have to be scheduled at a fairly low frequency, a patient
might not remember to contact her dentist when it is time for a new check-up. We assume
that this occurs with probability 1   . Hence, in t0, a patient only enters the decision
problem with probability 0 <   1.7 Note that, in principle, it is also conceivable that
a patient arranges an appointment in t0, but does not remember the appointment anymore
when arriving at t1. Given that the average time gap between arranging and attending an
appointment in our setup is only 14 days, we abstract from this possibility. Incorporating this
additional facet of memory limitations would not qualitatively change the analysis.
If the patient processes the decision problem in t0 she contacts the dentist to arrange a
check-up if
c0  c^0 :=  F (c^1) [H   E(c1jc1  c^1)], (2)
7In this way, we capture a central theme of a broader class of models on limited attention, memory, and
complexity (e.g., Eliaz and Spiegler 2011, Karlan et al. 2013, Calzolari and Nardotto 2014). In general, people
have a very large set of alternative tasks and choices available at any point in time. To reduce complexity, a
given task might thus not always enter the set of relevant problems that are processed by a decision maker.
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i.e., whenever the costs of scheduling the check-up (c0) are below the expected net benets
of the check-up.8 Assuming that c0 is independently distributed according to the c.d.f. G(:)
over the interval [0; c0], the probability of arranging an appointment is given by G(c^0). It is
straightforward to show that G(c^0) depends positively on both  and . A lower degree of
awareness about the benets of prevention or a stronger present bias will therefore both reduce
a patient's likelihood of arranging an appointment. Independently of the rule described in (2),
stronger memory limitations will further reduce the likelihood of scheduling an appointment,
because the patient enters the decision problem in t0 with a lower probability .
2.3 Treatment eects
The framework from the previous section illustrates that memory limitations, limited aware-
ness, and present biases all reduce a patient's likelihood of having check-ups. How could
reminders inuence patients' behavior in this setting? First, reminders bring the task of
scheduling a new appointment to people's minds. They might thus increase the level of 
and encourage patients with memory limitations to arrange more check-ups. Second, some
of our reminders provide patients with information about the benets of prevention. These
reminders might induce more check-ups as they lift the level of  for partially unaware pa-
tients. Third, all of our reminders include the dentist's contact details. This might reduce
the transaction costs of arranging an appointment (c0) and lead to an increase in check-ups
for all patients. Hence, even though our reminders do not specically address present biases,
they might raise the check-up rate of present-biased patients through the general reduction
in the costs of responding.
By analyzing outcomes along our rst treatment dimension { i.e., by comparing responses
of patients who received a reminder to those who did not { we can examine whether reminders
aect patients' check-up behavior, regardless of the underlying mechanisms. From a public
policy perspective, this is perhaps the most important question. In addition, the comparison
of response rates between the dierent reminder treatments can shed some light on the relative
importance of dierent underlying mechanisms. Even though our experiment is not designed
to precisely pin down one specic channel through which reminders work, this allows us to
narrow down the set of relevant motives for patients' treatment responses.
8For simplicity we focus on the case that patients hold unbiased beliefs about , , , and F (:). An
interesting deviation from this level of sophistication concerns (partially) naive patients, who anticipate a
present bias ~ which is less severe than their true bias (1  ~ > ). An extended appendix, which is available
from the authors upon request, provides a discussion of how this can shape patients' check-up behavior.
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To see this, consider rst the hypothesis that patients experience limitations in memory
and attention ( < 1), while limited awareness about the benets of prevention plays no role
( = 1). In this case, reminders induce Rem > No-Rem, thereby raising the check-up frequency
of treated patients relative to the control group. Given that the memory-enhancing eect is
similar for the dierent types of reminders (i.e., Neut ' PosF ' PosM ' NegF ' NegM ),
however, we should observe not behavioral dierences across the reminder treatments.
In contrast, under the alternative hypothesis of limited awareness being crucial ( < 1),
our framework predicts dierential eects for the dierent reminders treatments (for any given
level of ). The framed treatments, which all stress the benets [costs] of [not] making dental
check-ups, should raise awareness relative to the Neutral and No-Reminder treatment, where
no such information is provided (i.e., No-Rem ' Neut < PosM ' PosF ' NegM ' NegF ).
If limited awareness is the key mechanism behind patients' response to treatments, we should
therefore observe that the framed reminders have a stronger eect than the neutral reminder.
If, in addition, we observe no dierences in the number of check-ups between the Neutral and
the No-Reminder treatment, this would be strong evidence that neither a cost-reducing eect
of reminders nor memory limitations are relevant (i.e.,  = 1).
Further inference on the awareness channel can be drawn by analyzing dierences in reac-
tions to the positively and negatively framed reminders. Starting with Tversky and Kahneman
(1981), a large body of literature has shown that the framing of messages can alter people's
perception of the information that is provided. In our context, this could imply system-
atic dierences between Pos and Neg with corresponding treatment dierences in check-up
frequencies.9 Similarly, the way people process the information on the postcards (i.e., the
reminder's impact on ) might depend on the gender framing. We can examine such eects
by comparing responses between PosF , NegF and PosM , NegM . This explorative analysis
can be further motivated by evidence from other domains, such as consumers' responses to
advertisement (Bertrand et al. 2010) or fundraising campaigns (Landry et al. 2006), which
suggests that gender framing eects might be quantitatively important.
Since all postcards in our experiment remind patients about the need to schedule a new
appointment and provide them with the dentist's contact details, it is dicult to dierentiate
a memory-enhancing eect (an increase in ) from a general reduction of transaction costs
9Earlier studies in health psychology have explored the eects of negative and positive frames in health
communications. The evidence, however, has remained somewhat inconclusive regarding the size and direction
of the framing eects (see O'Keefe and Jensen 2009 and Gallagher and Updegra 2012 for recent reviews).
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due to reminders (lower levels of c0). Arguably, however, the pure transaction-cost eect is
likely to be small, given that the dentist's contact details are easily accessible via the internet
or stored in the electronic directories of patients' mobile phones. In fact, evidence from a
randomized trial in the UK indicates that including contact details in patients' reminders has
no additional impact relative to a simple reminder that does not contain this information
(Behavioural Insights Team 2014). In what follows, we therefore focus on the reminders' role
in tackling patients' limitations in memory and awareness about the benets of prevention.
3 Implementation of the experiment
We conducted the experiment in cooperation with a dentist in Bonn, Germany. At their rst
visit at the dentist, patients are classied depending on their dental health status as `regular'
or `at-risk' patients, corresponding to recommended check-up frequencies of 6 or 4 months,
respectively. We use this classication to determine who enters the experiment at a given
point in time. In particular, patients with a recommended m-month frequency who have not
been at the dentist since m months are marked with a reminder ag. On a monthly basis, we
randomly assign all patients with an active ag to our treatments. When a patient is treated
(or stays untreated in case she is assigned to the control group) or when a patient comes to
a check-up, we switch o her reminder ag for another m months.10 Hence, a patient will
receive reminders in intervals of at least m months.
Note that the procedure implies that we randomize within a selected sample: patients
who schedule their check-ups in a particularly timely manner are less likely to be part of our
sample, whereas patients who are not sticking to their recommended check-up schedule have
a higher likelihood of participating in the experiment. From a public health perspective, our
experimental sample seems to be interesting for implementing nudge-based policies, since it
pools people who rationally postpone check-ups with others who might exhibit sub-optimally
low check-up frequencies due to memory limitations, unawareness, or present biases.
Patients are assigned to each of our six treatments with equal probability. In each ran-
domization wave, members of the same household are assigned to the same treatment. By
randomizing at the household level we try to avoid possible treatment spillovers (Miguel and
Kremer 2004) and minimize patients' consciousness of an ongoing experiment. Note further
that several patients are treated more than once during the 11 months in which the experiment
10If a patient visits the dentist after the ag is generated but before we randomize, the ag is switched o
as well.
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was conducted. This is the case since some patients are agged for a check-up at two points
in time during the experimental period. We independently randomize each time a patient is
up for a check-up. This procedure generates random treatment sequences, which allows us to
study the impact of repeatedly treating patients and the role of dierent treatment orders.
The experiment was conducted between April 2010 and March 2011. Overall, our sample
covers 1227 instances in which a patient was up for a check-up appointment. These cases
spread over 817 individuals from 713 households. For roughly half of the patients, we thus
have data on repeated treatment sequences.11 Randomization was implemented in 11 waves,
with reminders being sent out on average every ve weeks. All postcards were sent out by the
dentist on Fridays, immediately after randomization took place. According to Deutsche Post,
postcards should be delivered on Monday at the latest. We therefore measure the response
time (in days), starting with the Monday after a randomization wave as day 1. For the
response duration in the control group, we use the same starting day.
Our main variable of interest is whether or not a participant calls the dentist for scheduling
an appointment. The date of the call measures the rst point in time at which people respond
to our intervention. In a second step, we study patients' actual show up at the check-up
appointment (which is, on average, scheduled 14 days after a patient called). Considering
the date of the rst contact rather than the actual check-up has the advantage that it avoids
potential congestion in check-up dates due to the dentist's capacity limits. More precisely,
one might worry that nding longer delays in check-up dates for the No-Reminder condition
might be the result of the response of patients in the reminder treatments, who `block' dates
for earlier appointments.
In addition to our main outcome variables, we compiled a rich set of patient background
characteristics. Next to the patient's gender, age, and risk classication (i.e., the recom-
mended check-up interval), we measure whether a patient is covered by private or public
health insurance (Private HI ).12 We also observe whether a patient lives in a household in
11Note that these gures reect incidences of intention to treat: our data include about 5% of cases where
reminders could not be delivered, e.g., because the patient had moved. The results reported below therefore
slightly underestimate the impact of reminders in terms of treatment-on-treated eects.
12 Controlling for insurance status is important since contractual terms might dier under private and
public health insurance (see above). Moreover, in the German health system, the privately insured are a
selected sample since only persons with a gross yearly income above 50K Euro, self-employed individuals, and
civil servants are eligible for private health insurance. Due to Bonn's history as the former capital of West
Germany, a large part of the privately health insured in our sample seem to be civil servants.
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Treatment No-Rem Neutral PosF PosM NegF NegM Total F-test t-test
(p-values)
Age 37.23 38.62 40.11 36.64 37.28 38.40 38.05 0.128 0.364
(13.42) (13.48) (13.88) (13.32) (13.28) (14.19) (13.62)
Male 0.458 0.406 0.388 0.421 0.430 0.376 0.412 0.592 0.159
(0.500) (0.492) (0.488) (0.495) (0.496) (0.485) (0.492)
Family 0.151 0.129 0.092 0.134 0.087 0.108 0.117 0.288 0.105
(0.359) (0.336) (0.290) (0.341) (0.282) (0.311) (0.321)
Private HI 0.219 0.138 0.204 0.193 0.193 0.174 0.186 0.369 0.202
(0.414) (0.346) (0.404) (0.396) (0.396) (0.380) (0.389)
At-Risk 0.182 0.138 0.209 0.257 0.159 0.094 0.172 <0.001 0.680
(0.387) (0.346) (0.408) (0.438) (0.367) (0.292) (0.378)
Patient 3.717 3.627 3.830 3.410 3.546 3.549 3.611 0.593 0.505
retention (2.401) (2.366) (2.471) (2.292) (2.473) (2.435) (2.406)
Regular 0.469 0.482 0.447 0.405 0.470 0.466 0.457 0.727 0.731
(0.500) (0.501) (0.499) (0.492) (0.500) (0.500) (0.498)
Pain 0.249 0.196 0.172 0.237 0.204 0.252 0.218 0.292 0.272
(0.433) (0.398) (0.378) (0.427) (0.404) (0.435) (0.413)
Distance 0.125 0.217 0.125 0.138 0.117 0.116 0.141 0.296 0.646
(0.444) (0.776) (0.370) (0.557) (0.408) (0.377) (0.513)
Rental price 7.194 7.131 7.168 7.147 7.318 7.087 7.173 0.494 0.793
(1.181) (1.183) (1.224) (1.182) (1.225) (1.264) (1.210)
N 192 217 196 202 207 213 1227
Table 1: Background characteristics. Mean values (standard deviations in parentheses).
Notes: `Family' is a dummy, indicating if several household members took part in the study. `Private HI'
is equal to 1 if a patient is covered by private health insurance (0 for public health insurance). `At-Risk'
indicates if a patient is recommended a 4 months check-up interval. `Patient retention' is the number of
years since a patient rst visited the dentist. `Distance' is the great-circle distance between a patient's home
address and the dentist (scale: 1 = 100km). `Rental price' is the average rent at the patient's home address
(Euros per square meter, excluding utilities and dues). The dummy `Regular' indicates whether a patient
made at least two check-ups in the year prior to a given randomization wave. `Pain' indicates if a patient
was exposed to a painful dental treatment in the past. Time-variant patient characteristics (e.g., age, patient
retention, etc.) are computed at each randomization wave. The nal two columns report (i) p-values of F-tests
from regressions of the respective characteristics on individual treatment dummies and (ii) p-values of t-tests
comparing the characteristics in the No-Reminder treatment vs. all patients who received a reminder.
which other household members took part in the experiment (Family).13 We further measure
when a patient rst visited the dentist, and derive information about individuals' check-up
and dental treatment history before the experiment. For people with a Patient retention of
more than 12 months, we construct an indicator whether a patient attended at least two
check-ups in the year prior to a randomization wave (Regular). Furthermore, we construct a
binary variable, Pain, which captures whether a patient was exposed to a major root canal
13To avoid confounds from parents arranging joint appointments for themselves and their children, our
analysis excludes children below the age of 15.
13
treatment or other painful dental treatments in the past.14 Beyond the information from the
dentist's database, we matched patients' precise address with data obtained from immobilien-
scout24.de, Germany's largest real estate platform. In this way, we obtain the average rental
price in the patients' neighborhood (Rental price). From the address data, we also compute
the spatial distance between each patient's home and the dentist (Distance).
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of our data and summarizes the outcomes of
randomization. Patients in our sample are on average 38 years old (with age varying between
15 and 92 years), 41% of them are male, and about 12% belong to households in which
additional family members are patients at the dentist. As noted above, about 20% of patients
are covered by private health insurance. On average, individuals in our sample have been
patients at the dentist for 3.6 years, and 17% are classied as at-risk patients.
The nal two columns of Table 1 report validation checks on the randomization. Compar-
ing patients in the control treatment to all patients who received a reminder (pooled sample)
yields no signicant dierences in patients' background characteristics (see nal column of Ta-
ble 1). This indicates that randomization in patient characteristics was successful for our most
important treatment comparison. F-tests from regressions of the individual patient character-
istics on dummies for the dierent treatment conditions yield no signicant dierence except
for the fraction of at-risk patients.
4 Results
This section presents our empirical results. Section 4.1 analyzes whether reminders increase
the number of arranged and attended check-up appointments, and whether the observed eects
are persistent over time. Based on our ndings we also explore the underlying motives for
patients' responses. Section 4.2 discusses whether the impact of reminders diers for dierent
groups of patients. Section 4.3 studies how people respond if they are nudged repeatedly.
14The results presented below are robust to using alternative denitions of patients' check-up history and
painful treatments. Note that one can not directly compare the gures on patients' check-up and treatment
history from Table 1 with the check-up frequencies reported below, as the numbers in Table 1 are based on
`incidences of being treated' (i.e., individual patients may enter the calculation more than once).
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4.1 Do reminders inuence behavior?
Descriptive analysis
Figure 2 provides a rst impression of how reminders aect patient behavior. The gure
depicts the fraction of patients who contact the dentist within one month after the treatment
intervention. We observe a strong eect of reminders on patients' responses. On average, the
fraction of patients who schedule a check-up in the reminder treatments is more than twice as
high as in the group of patients that did not receive a reminder (19.3% vs. 8.9%). Compared
to the strong overall impact of being reminded, the exact content of the reminder message
seems to matter relatively little. Response rates for the dierent reminder treatments all lie
in an interval between 16.3% (PosM) and 23.0% (Neutral). In particular, Figure 2 indicates
that the reminders that contain additional information on the benets of prevention yield
response rates that are similar to those in the Neutral treatment.
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Figure 2: Impact of reminders on response rates. Fraction of patients who contact the dentist
within 30 days after treatment intervention.
The strong direct impact of reminders on patients' response rates naturally raises the
question whether these patterns also persist in the long run. A rst answer to this question
is given by Figure 3, which depicts the cumulative frequency of responses for patients in
the reminder treatments (black line) and the control treatment (grey line) over the rst 100
15
days after our treatment intervention.15 For ease of illustration, the gure pools the dierent
reminder treatments. A more rened analysis of individual treatment dierences is provided
in the regression analysis below and in Figure A.2 in the appendix.
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Figure 3: Cumulated response in the reminder treatments (black line) and the control group
(grey line).
Substantiating what we have already seen in Figure 2, the graph demonstrates that already
a few days after receiving a reminder, the response rate is strictly higher for treated patients.
Over time, the gap in response rates declines slightly, but the treatment eect never vanishes.
For days 51{100, the treatment dierence remains almost constant at 8 percentage points.
Overall, patients in the reminder conditions thus retain a persistently higher frequency of
making check-up appointments.
Estimation analysis
In a next step, we parametrically estimate short-run treatment eects as well as the incidence
and timing of patients' responses in a duration framework. Throughout our analysis, we
also examine whether the observed short- and long-run eects are robust to controlling for
patient characteristics and potential seasonal dierences. As our outcome variable, we rst
consider patient responses, i.e., whether a patient contacts the dentist to arrange a check-up
appointment. Later we analyze whether patients actually show up at their appointments.
15Analyzing response rates for a longer time period is problematic because at-risk patients will already
receive their next reminder.
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The analysis of short-run responses builds on the model
Resp30 =  +  Rem + 1Rem  PosF + 2Rem  PosM
+ 3Rem  NegF + 4Rem  NegM +X +W+ ". (3)
The dependent variable, Resp30, measures whether a patient contacts the dentist within 30
days after the intervention and arranges a check-up appointment. X is a vector of patient
characteristics andW includes dummies for the dierent randomization waves. Rem indicates
whether a person has received any reminder postcard. The coecient  thus identies the
main reminder eect. In the full specication of equation (3),  measures the impact of the
neutral reminder relative to the control group. The eect of the framed reminders is given by
 + k, k 2 f1; 2; 3; 4g. Each -coecient thus captures the dierences between the neutral
and a framed reminder.
Columns (1){(5) of Table 2 report estimation results from linear probability models.16
Specication (1) estimates the average impact of reminders on patients' response rates. The
estimate shows that the overall dierence in response rates is sizeable and highly signicant
(p < 0:001). Specication (2) includes treatment dummies for the reminders that contain
additional information, providing us with estimates on the short-run eects of the individual
reminder treatments. This estimation yields two important basic results. First, compared to
the control treatment, response rates are signicantly higher in each of the reminder treat-
ments (F -tests for signicance of +k: p < 0:001 for Neutral and Pos
F ; p = 0:031 for PosM ;
p = 0:011 for NegF ; p = 0:009 for NegM). Second, as already illustrated in Figure 2, all of the
treatments with framed reminders display a slightly weaker increase in response rates than
the neutral treatment. These dierences to the neutral reminder, as well as all other pairwise
dierences between the individual reminder treatments turn out to be insignicant.
The two basic results from column (2) hardly change when we include dummies for the
randomization waves (column 3) and controls for a basic set of background characteristics
(column 4). Specication (5) includes the full set of controls (which slightly reduces the
sample size due to missing observations). The point estimate in this specication indicates
that the neutral reminder increases the response rate by 14.5 percentage points relative to
16To avoid complications with the interpretation of marginal eects from interaction terms in non-linear
models (Ai and Norton 2003), we focus on LPM estimations. Results from probit estimations, which yield
very similar results, are available from the authors. For all estimations, we report robust standard errors that
account for potential clustering at the household level.
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Dependent
variable: Response within 30 days Actual check-ups (30 days)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Reminder 0.105??? 0.142??? 0.133??? 0.129??? 0.145??? 0.103??? 0.139??? 0.130??? 0.126??? 0.140???
[0.024] [0.038] [0.038] [0.038] [0.040] [0.022] [0.036] [0.036] [0.036] [0.038]
Rem  PosF -0.011 -0.010 -0.017 -0.031 -0.003 -0.002 -0.007 -0.023
[0.044] [0.043] [0.042] [0.044] [0.043] [0.042] [0.041] [0.043]
Rem  PosM -0.067 -0.065 -0.059 -0.074? -0.068? -0.066? -0.059 -0.075?
[0.041] [0.041] [0.041] [0.042] [0.040] [0.039] [0.040] [0.041]
Rem  NegF -0.057 -0.054 -0.051 -0.072? -0.048 -0.045 -0.042 -0.061
[0.040] [0.040] [0.040] [0.043] [0.038] [0.038] [0.038] [0.041]
Rem  NegM -0.052 -0.051 -0.054 -0.064 -0.062 -0.060 -0.062 -0.074?
[0.043] [0.042] [0.042] [0.045] [0.040] [0.040] [0.040] [0.043]
Male -0.021 -0.007 -0.010 0.005
[0.023] [0.024] [0.022] [0.022]
Age 0.003??? 0.001 0.003??? 0.002?
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Family 0.004 0.008 0.018 0.021
[0.037] [0.038] [0.036] [0.037]
Private HI -0.028 -0.023 -0.016 -0.015
[0.029] [0.028] [0.028] [0.027]
Distance -0.041?? -0.046??? -0.033? -0.042???
[0.019] [0.009] [0.019] [0.008]
Patient retention 0.007 0.007 0.005 0.005
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005]
At-Risk -0.001 -0.018 -0.011 -0.026
[0.034] [0.035] [0.031] [0.032]
Regular 0.148??? 0.118???
[0.025] [0.024]
Pain -0.025 -0.041
[0.027] [0.025]
Rental price 0.030??? 0.025???
[0.009] [0.008]
Constant 0.089??? 0.089??? 0.126??? 0.024 -0.220?? 0.073??? 0.073??? 0.123??? 0.020 -0.168?
[0.020] [0.020] [0.039] [0.050] [0.089] [0.019] [0.019] [0.038] [0.047] [0.086]
Wave dummies no no yes yes yes no no yes yes yes
N 1,227 1,227 1,227 1,227 1,095 1,227 1,227 1,227 1,227 1,095
Table 2: Short-run treatment eects
All specications are estimated with a linear probability model. In specications (1){(5), the dependent
variable indicates whether a patient contacted the dentist within 30 days. In specication (6){(10), the
dependent variable indicates whether the arranged check-up was actually attended. Robust standard errors,
clustered at the household-level, are reported in brackets. ???, ?? and ? indicates signicance at a 1%-, 5%-,
and 10%-level, respectively.
the control group. The increase in response rates is again somewhat less pronounced for all
reminders with additional information. For the PosM and the NegF treatment the dierence
to the Neutral treatment is statistically signicant (p < 0:1). Relative to the untreated control
group, however, all framed reminders still display a signicantly positive eect on the short-
run response rate (p = 0:003 for PosF , p = 0:053 for PosM , p = 0:051 for NegF , p = 0:033 for
NegM).17
17Consistent with earlier evidence on socio-demographic correlates of dental health prevention (e.g., Lang
et al. 1994), specications (4) and (5) of Table 2 also document that several patient characteristics inuence
response behavior.
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We next turn to the duration analysis that more rigourously examines the data underlying
Figure 3. Using a Cox proportional hazard model, we estimate the equation
h(t) = h0(t) exp(1Neutral + 2Pos
F + 3Pos
M + 4Neg
F + 4Neg
M +X +W). (4)
Estimated hazard ratios from dierent specications of the model are reported in columns (1){
(5) of Table 3. Column (1) shows that patients who received a reminder exhibit on average
a 42% higher hazard rate than the control group. Starting with column (2), we estimate
separate eects for the dierent reminder treatments. In line with the results for the short-
run responses, the estimates document that all reminders increase the patients' likelihood to
arrange an appointment. The hazard ratio for Neutral, the treatment with the strongest eect,
is roughly 1.5. A similar eect is found for the PosF treatment. For the other treatments,
the coecients imply that the chance of contacting the dentist (conditional on not having
done so before) is increased by a factor of 1.1{1.4 relative to the control treatment. Except
for the PosM treatment, the eects for the individual reminders reported in column (2) are
statistically signicant. When we include wave dummies and further controls (columns 3{5)
the estimated hazard ratios slightly decrease, but the point estimates remain well above one in
all cases. Comparing the estimates for the individual reminder treatments against each other,
we again nd only moderate dierences between the dierent reminders. The only pairwise
treatment comparison which indicates a signicant dierence in hazard ratios is for Neutral
vs. PosM in specications (2) and (3) of Table 3 (p = 0:088 and p = 0:091, respectively).
The design of our experiment also allows us to examine whether there are systematic
dierences in the responses to a positive or negative framing of the reminders' content, or in
the response to the `gender framing' of the postcard (compare, e.g., Tversky and Kahneman
1981, Landry et al. 2006, Bertrand et al. 2010). To do so, we estimate two sets of alternative
model specications in which we compare the pooled treatment eects from both positively
and both negatively framed postcards, as well as the postcards with female and male covers.
The results, which are reported in Tables A.3 and A.4 in the appendix, indicate that applying
gain vs. loss frames does not signicantly aect short- or long-run responses in our setup.
Similarly, while the reminders with female covers trigger somewhat higher response rates than
those with male covers, the dierence between the two types of reminders is insignicant in
most specications.
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Dependent
variable: Duration to response Duration to actual check-up
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Reminder 1.418?? 1.473??
(0.019) (0.016)
Neutral 1.581?? 1.506?? 1.488?? 1.542?? 1.629?? 1.527?? 1.505?? 1.528??
(0.014) (0.031) (0.032) (0.027) (0.015) (0.037) (0.042) (0.043)
PosF 1.563?? 1.479?? 1.401? 1.486?? 1.700??? 1.589?? 1.503?? 1.544??
(0.014) (0.035) (0.068) (0.041) (0.005) (0.017) (0.035) (0.030)
PosM 1.161 1.111 1.116 1.135 1.161 1.097 1.106 1.113
(0.449) (0.597) (0.577) (0.537) (0.484) (0.665) (0.633) (0.624)
NegF 1.428?? 1.365? 1.351? 1.360 1.534?? 1.447? 1.432? 1.409?
(0.048) (0.092) (0.098) (0.105) (0.024) (0.060) (0.063) (0.085)
NegM 1.371? 1.315 1.261 1.269 1.367 1.293 1.244 1.202
(0.086) (0.141) (0.208) (0.208) (0.114) (0.201) (0.269) (0.364)
Wave dummies no no yes yes yes no no yes yes yes
Controls no no no yesi yesii no no no yesi yesii
N 1,227 1,227 1,227 1,227 1,095 1,227 1,227 1,227 1,227 1,095
Table 3: Duration analysis (Cox proportional hazard model)
The table reports hazard ratios from estimations based on Cox proportional hazards model. In specications
(1){(5), the dependent variables is the `duration' to a patient's response (i.e., the time between the treatment
date and the date at which a patient contacted the dentist, measured for up to 100 days after the treatment
intervention). Specications (6){(10) use the `duration' until the actual check-up (if it was attended). P -values
based on robust standard errors, clustered at the household-level, are reported in parentheses. Specication
(4) and (9) include the restricted, specications (5) and (10) the full set of control variables as reported in
column (4) and (5) of Table 2, respectively. ???, ?? and ? indicates signicance at a 1%-, 5%-, and 10%-level,
respectively.
To wrap up, our results so far demonstrate that reminder messages lead to a sizeable and
robust increase in the number of patients who schedule check-ups. In contrast to the strong
overall impact of being reminded, the specic content and framing of the reminder seems to
be less relevant. Hence, being reminded per se is of rst-order importance, whereas additional
information on the benets of prevention does not further increase patients' response rates
relative to a neutral reminder. This observation is important, as it indicates that raising
patients' awareness about the benets of dental prevention { the -channel in the framework
from Section 2.2 { seems to play a minor role for the reminder eects in our setup. Instead, our
evidence suggests that reminders work because they address limitations in patients' memory
and increase patients' attention ().
Arranging vs. attending a check-up
So far, we have focused on the impact of reminders on the propensity to arrange a check-up
appointment. From a policy perspective, however, the crucial question is whether patients
actually attend more check-ups. The positive impact of reminders could be partially or fully
oset if patients in the reminder treatments are more likely to miss their appointments. In
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a next step, we therefore analyze whether the increase in scheduled appointments due to
reminders also translates into a higher number of realized check-ups.
The answer to this question is a clear `yes'. The frequency of missed appointments in the
reminder treatments actually lies below the respective number for the No-Reminder treatment:
conditional on having arranged an appointment within a month, 17.6% of patients in the
control group, but only 10.0% of patients in the reminder treatments miss their check-up
date.18 While the dierence is not statistically signicant (p = 0:423), the numbers indicate
that the reminder eects documented above are not diluted by missed appointments. This
is further corroborated in columns (6){(10) of Table 2, which replicate the estimates of the
short-run treatment eects using an indicator for actual check-up attendance as dependent
variable. The estimated coecients are essentially identical to those of the basic response
estimations (compare columns 1{5). If anything, the relative impact of reminders is even
stronger when we account for missed appointments: the estimates in column (6) document
that the overall fraction of patients who contact the dentist within a month and actually
show up at their check-up increases from 7.3% in the control to 17.6% for the treated group
(p < 0:001). Controlling for wave xed eects and patient characteristics does not alter this
result.
The picture does not change if we look at a longer response period of 100 days. Missed
appointments again occur less frequently in the reminder treatments than in the No-Reminder
condition (9.7% vs. 14.0%, p = 0:460). Hence it is not surprising that the duration analysis
for actual check-up attendance, reported in columns (6){(10) of Table 3, yields qualitatively
similar but slightly stronger results than the ones for arranged appointments. The specication
in column (6) shows that the hazard ratio for actual check-ups in the treated group is now
1.47 (as compared to 1.42 in column 1). Comparing columns (7){(10) with columns (2){(5)
of Table 3, we nd that the three treatments with the strongest impact on patients' behavior
display marginally higher (Neutral) and more precisely estimated (PosF , NegF ) hazard ratios.
The estimates for the two treatments that exhibit weaker eects hardly change (PosM , NegM).
Note further that all hazard ratios are still above one for the alternative dependent variable.
Moreover, the comparison of check-up attendance between the dierent reminder treatments
once more conrms our earlier results on dierences in patients' response rates: almost all
18A possible interpretation of this nding is that { in addition to pointing forgetful patients to arrange a new
check-up { reminders might also serve as an `aide memoire' that reminds these patients about the upcoming
appointment.
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of the pairwise dierences between the individual reminder treatments are insignicant. The
only exceptions are the Neutral and PosF treatment, which dier from the PosM treatment
at the 10% level in specications (7) and (8) of Table 3.
In sum, the results on check-up attendance corroborate our ndings on how patients'
respond to reminders. In particular, we observe that reminders do not come at the cost of
increasing the rate of missed appointments. Our evidence thus shows that reminders indeed
succeed in encouraging people to make more check-ups.
4.2 Does one reminder `t all'?
We next turn to the question whether certain groups of patients are especially responsive
to reminders, and whether particular types of reminders have stronger or weaker eects in
dierent subgroups of the population. From a policy perspective, this analysis is interesting
as it provides insights on whether targeting dierent groups of patients with type-specic re-
minders can increase their overall eectiveness. To address this question, we estimate models
that interact treatment eects with patients' background characteristics. We analyze treat-
ment interactions with respect to each patient's gender, age, health insurance, and risk status.
In addition, we consider the rental prices in a patient's neighborhood as well as a patient's
past check-up attendance and exposure to painful dental treatments. To keep the exposition
tractable, we focus on short-run responses and pool the observations from the treatments with
positive and negative framing, respectively.19
Results from the interacted models are reported in Table 4. Column (1) presents the treat-
ment eects from the non-interacted model. All further specications display the interaction
eects with a dierent background characteristic (D). The coecients thus allow to compare
the dierent treatment eects between subgroups of patients that do or do not exhibit the
corresponding characteristic D. The estimates in column (2), for instance, indicate that the
neutral reminder increases responses among female patients by 13.2 percentage points. For
males the corresponding eect is insignicantly lower by 0.4 percentage points.
The results in Table 4 reinforce our ndings on the eectiveness of the neutral reminder.
For almost all subgroups, this reminder triggers qualitatively the highest response rate. There
is not a single group for which the reminders with additional information signicantly out-
19The corresponding estimations studying interactions with all individual treatments, actual check-up at-
tendance, or hazard-rate models with a longer time horizon again yield qualitatively similar results. Results
are available from the authors upon request.
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Dependent variable: Response within 30 days
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
D = { Male Age Priv.HI At-Risk Pain Regular Rent
Reminder 0.129??? 0.132??? 0.130??? 0.164??? 0.125??? 0.116?? 0.107?? 0.146???
[0.038] [0.048] [0.038] [0.040] [0.041] [0.046] [0.048] [0.040]
Rem  D -0.004 0.000 -0.182? 0.005 0.138 0.079 0.097???
[0.073] [0.003] [0.097] [0.101] [0.095] [0.080] [0.029]
Rem  Pos -0.038 -0.027 -0.039 -0.042 -0.058 -0.018 -0.076? -0.054
[0.036] [0.046] [0.036] [0.040] [0.039] [0.042] [0.044] [0.038]
Rem  Pos  D -0.027 0.002 0.036 0.113 -0.171? 0.052 -0.039
[0.069] [0.003] [0.090] [0.097] [0.095] [0.079] [0.029]
Rem  Neg -0.052 -0.033 -0.053 -0.058 -0.064 -0.032 -0.095?? -0.070?
[0.036] [0.045] [0.036] [0.040] [0.039] [0.044] [0.045] [0.039]
Rem  Neg  D -0.049 0.000 0.047 0.086 -0.171? 0.056 -0.051?
[0.068] [0.003] [0.089] [0.099] [0.093] [0.078] [0.028]
D 0.007 0.002 0.093 -0.078 -0.027 0.045 -0.022
[0.043] [0.002] [0.062] [0.058] [0.048] [0.046] [0.016]
Controls yesi yesi yesi yesi yesi yesii yesii yesii
N 1,227 1,227 1,227 1,227 1,227 1,095 1,095 1,095
Table 4: Short-run treatment eects: Interaction with patient background characteristics
The table presents the interaction of treatment eects with dierent background characteristics (captured
in variables D). All specications include a full set of wave dummies and a constant; specications (1){(5)
[(6){(8)] include the restricted [full] set of control variables. In specications (3) and (8), the interaction
variables (age and rental prices) are centered around their respective mean values. Robust standard errors,
clustered at the household-level, are reported in brackets. ???, ?? and ? indicates signicance at a 1%-, 5%-,
and 10%-level, respectively.
perform the neutral reminder. In some subgroups, response rates for the framed reminders
even fall signicantly below those of the Neutral treatment. For instance, for patients who
had a painful treatment experience in the past (column 6) as well as for those who did not
regularly attend past check-ups (column 7), the framed reminders erode the positive eects
of the neutral treatment, bringing the response rate almost down to the level of the untreated
control group.20 Column (4) of Table 4 further reveals that there is one group of patients who
do not react to reminders. Among patients covered by private health insurance, none of the
reminders induces a signicant increase in check-up appointments. The absence of a reminder
eect for this subgroup might be attributable to dierences in insurance conditions (e.g., the
typically higher costs of check-ups in private health plans), which in turn could lead to more
deliberate planning of check-up frequencies.
20A possible interpretation of these ndings is that reminders with more `personal' cover illustrations might
be more likely to bring back memories of painful experiences or fears.
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Overall, our analysis reveals only a few signicant interactions between patients' back-
ground characteristics and the impact of dierent reminders.21 A unied reminder might
therefore be preferable to (costly) targeting of specic subgroups with dierent types of re-
minders. Moreover, there are no subgroups where adding information increases the eective-
ness of the reminders. This again indicates that mitigating unawareness about the benets of
prevention is of limited relevance in our context.
4.3 Being `nudged' more than once
The nal step of our analysis turns to the question whether reminder eects depend on a
patient's past exposure to the nudge. Over the course of our experiment, several people in
our sample were treated more than once. For these patients, random treatment assignment
generates dierent sequences of treatments. In particular, among the group of patients who
are up for a check-up at two points in time during our experiment, at T1 and at T2, we can
compare the following four treatment sequences: (1) Patients who neither received a reminder
in T1 nor in T2 (i.e., patients who are in the control group twice), (2) patients who received a
reminder in T1 and in T2 (RemT1RemT2), (3) patients who were untreated in T1, but were
reminded in T2 (NoRemT1RemT2), and nally (4) patients who received a reminder in T1,
but not in T2 (RemT1NoRemT2).
To analyze whether these dierent sequences generate dierential response patterns after
the second treatment intervention, we estimate the model
Resp30T2 = 0 + 1RemT1  RemT2 + 2NoRemT1  RemT2 + 3RemT1  NoRemT2 + , (5)
where Resp30T2 is an indicator for a response within 30 days after the second intervention (at
T2). As an alternative outcome variable we also consider a dummy for actual attendance at a
check-up. The coecients 1 and 2 measure the reminder eects at T2 relative to the group
which remains untreated twice, for patients who did (1) or did not (2) receive a reminder in
T1. Comparing these coecients allows us to assess whether reminders have a stronger eect
when they are applied twice (which would imply 1 > 2) or whether repeatedly nudging
21This also holds for alternative specications of the interacted models. For instance, we nd little systematic
dierences in how the various subgroups react to reminders with female vs. male cover framings. A notable
exception concerns the `gender match' between the patient and the postcard cover. Complementing earlier
evidence on `gender match' eects in other domains (e.g., Landry et al. 2006, Bertrand et al. 2010), we observe
that both genders react similarly to postcards with neutral or female covers, but that the reminder eect for
male postcards is particularly weak (and turns insignicant) among male patients.
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people has a weaker impact (1 < 2). By comparing 1 and 2, we can therefore assess
whether reminders work mostly through a `surprise' or a `habituation' eect, or whether the
eect is independent of a patient's history of receiving reminders.
The coecient 3 captures the behavior in the group that does not receive a reminder in
T2, after having received one in T1. An estimate of 3 < 0 would indicate that `taking away'
the reminder has detrimental eects, in the sense that patients' response rate falls below the
one of the reference group that was neither reminded in T1 nor in T2. This could be the case,
for instance, if people get used to being nudged and rely too heavily on receiving the next
reminder. We thus explicitly address the concern that nudges can not easily be taken away
{ a point that has been raised by critics of libertarian paternalism (e.g., Rizzo and Whitman
2009).
The results from estimating equation (5) are reported in columns (1){(4) of Table 5.
Columns (5){(8) consider the eect on actual check-ups.22 The estimates again document
highly signicant reminder eects. Column (1) shows that the reminders have a slightly
weaker eect when applied repeatedly. Relative to the group that is untreated in both T1
and T2, reminders increase the response by 16 percentage points for those who are treated
for the second time, while the increase is 21 percentage points for the group that receives
their rst reminder in T2. While the sample size is limited and the dierence in coecients is
not statistically signicant (p = 0:573), the results suggest that habituation seems of limited
importance: if anything, the impact of receiving a second nudge in a row is slightly weaker
than the impact of a rst nudge after an untreated period.
The weakly positive coecient for 3 reinforces this impression. It indicates that taking
away reminders does not lead to a drop in the likelihood of making a check-up, relative to
the group of people who had not been exposed to reminders in T1 or T2. Rather, patients
who do not receive a reminder in T2 have very similar response rates, irrespective of whether
they had or had not received a nudge in T1. This indicates that the increase in check-ups
triggered by the reminders does not come at the potential cost of a decline in active patient
responses, once the nudge is taken away.
22Note that it would be misleading to directly compare the point estimates with those from Table 2, as the
results from Table 5 are based on a dierent sample. Note further that, in T2, we again randomize within a
selected sample since patients who arrange a check-up in time will not be part of the experiment, paralleling
the situation in T1 (see Section 3).
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Dependent variable: Response after second treatment (T2) Check-up after second treatment (T2)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
RemT1RemT2 0.158??? 0.144??? 0.218??? 0.227? 0.143??? 0.135??? 0.204?? 0.201?
(1) [0.050] [0.047] [0.082] [0.119] [0.050] [0.048] [0.081] [0.117]
NoRemT1RemT2 0.207?? 0.198?? 0.249??? 0.274?? 0.208?? 0.203?? 0.253??? 0.278??
(2) [0.081] [0.082] [0.091] [0.137] [0.082] [0.082] [0.090] [0.134]
RemT1NoRemT2 0.027 0.008 0.091 0.085 0.034 0.024 0.100 0.089
(3) [0.053] [0.051] [0.090] [0.126] [0.055] [0.052] [0.090] [0.124]
ResponseT1 0.126
?? 0.128?? 0.010 0.068 0.073 -0.043
[0.060] [0.058] [0.064] [0.056] [0.055] [0.059]
Controls no no yesi yesii no no yesi yesii
N 392 392 392 375 392 392 392 375
Table 5: The eect of repeated treatment.
All specications are estimated with a linear probability model and include a full set of wave dummies. The
dependent variable is an indicator for a response within 30 days after the second treatment (columns 1{4).
Columns (5)-(8) consider actual check-ups. The sample is composed of patients that experienced a sequence
of two treatments. Specication (3) and (7) [(4) and (8)] include the restricted [full] set of control variables.
Robust standard errors, clustered at the household-level, are reported in parentheses. ???, ?? and ? indicates
signicance at a 1%-, 5%-, and 10%-level, respectively.
One might be concerned that the estimates are inuenced by whether or not a patient
made a check-up in T1, which in turn is aected by the treatment in T1. To account for this
potential concern, column (2) includes an indicator for patients' behavior in T1 (ResponseT1).
The point estimate for ResponseT1, however, should be treated with caution, as the dummy
is likely correlated with the error term in equation (5). The coecients for 1, 2, and 3 are
hardly aected when we include this new variable. Qualitatively, this also holds when we add
further control variables in Columns (3) and (4). The point estimates for 1 and 2 increase
but their dierence remains insignicant. Similarly, the point estimate for 3 remains positive
in all specications. Paralleling our earlier results, all eects remain qualitatively unchanged if
we consider actual check-up attendance after the second treatment (columns 5{8 of Table 5).
Extending the analysis of repeated exposure to reminders, we also studied whether dier-
ences in the sequences of receiving (i) neutral or framed reminders, (ii) positively or negatively
framed reminders, and (iii) male or female framings matter for the observed treatment eects.
In addition, we tested whether there are `alternation eects', in the sense that receiving dif-
ferent reminders in repeated treatment sequences strengthens or weakens the reminder eect.
Our analysis did neither reveal any further sequence eects nor any evidence on an eect from
alternating the nudges. One has to bear in mind, however, that the smaller sample size limits
the power of this analysis.
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5 Conclusions
Using random treatment assignment, we analyzed how reminders inuence patients' likelihood
of making dental check-ups. Our results document strong and persistent eects of reminders
on patient behavior. Importantly, the eect of reminders does not come at the cost of a
decline in active patient responses, once the nudge is taken away. From a public policy
perspective, our results thus demonstrate that reminders can be used as an unobtrusive and
low-cost instrument for encouraging health prevention. Our data further indicate that simple
nudges seem to work best: being reminded per se seems to be of rst-order importance,
whereas including additional information and framing does not further increase the frequency
of check-ups relative to a neutral reminder. Given that this observation generalizes to other
domains, it casts doubt on the eectiveness of negatively framed information { such as warning
messages on tobacco packages { in the regulation of (un)healthy behaviors.
The fact that providing additional information is ineective also indicates that limited
awareness about the benets of prevention seems to play a minor role in our context. In-
stead, the data suggest that our reminders primarily work because they address limitations
in patients' memory and attention. In order to precisely quantify the relative importance of
the dierent mechanisms at work, a full-edged structural assessment { as suggested in Card
et al. (2011) { seems a promising avenue for future research.
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A. Appendix
Figure A.1: Covers of reminder postcards. Top row (left to right): Neutral, PosF , and PosM
treatment. Bottom row (left to right): NegM and NegF treatment.
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Figure A.2: Cumulated response rates for individual treatments.
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Framing Text cover Message text back
Neutral time for dental preven-
tion
Please make an appointment for your next check-up.
Positive ...keep your nice smile
tomorrow
Investing some time in dental health prevention today
decreases your risk of a painful dental disease in the
future. In addition, you may avoid considerable costs
of involved treatments.
Please make an appointment for your next check-up.
Negative ...don't lose your nice
smile tomorrow
Not investing some time in dental health prevention
today increases your risk of a painful dental disease in
the future. In addition, you may incur considerable
costs of involved treatments.
Please make an appointment for your next check-up.
Table A.2: Text of reminder messages.
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Panel A
Dependent variable: Response within 30 days Actual check-up (30 days)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Reminder 0.142??? 0.129??? 0.144??? 0.139??? 0.126??? 0.140???
[0.038] [0.038] [0.040] [0.036] [0.036] [0.038]
Rem  Pos-Frames -0.039 -0.038 -0.053 -0.036 -0.034 -0.050
[0.037] [0.036] [0.038] [0.036] [0.035] [0.037]
Rem  Neg-Frames -0.054 -0.052 -0.068? -0.055 -0.052 -0.067?
[0.037] [0.036] [0.039] [0.035] [0.034] [0.037]
Wald-Tests (p-Values):
Pos = Neg 0.593 0.601 0.588 0.482 0.489 0.529
Wave dummies no yes yes no yes yes
Controls no yesi yesii no yesi yesii
N 1,227 1,227 1,095 1,227 1,227 1,095
Panel B
Dependent variable: Response within 30 days Actual check-up (30 days)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Reminder 0.142??? 0.129??? 0.144??? 0.139??? 0.126??? 0.140???
[0.038] [0.038] [0.040] [0.036] [0.036] [0.038]
Rem  F-Frames -0.034 -0.034 -0.052 -0.026 -0.025 -0.042
[0.037] [0.036] [0.038] [0.035] [0.034] [0.037]
Rem  M-Frames -0.059 -0.056 -0.069? -0.065? -0.061? -0.074??
[0.037] [0.037] [0.039] [0.036] [0.036] [0.038]
Wald-Tests (p-Values):
F = M 0.382 0.439 0.560 0.150 0.182 0.257
Wave dummies no yes yes no yes yes
Controls no yesi yesii no yesi yesii
N 1,227 1,227 1,095 1,227 1,227 1,095
Table A.3: Short-run treatment eects { alternative specications
Panel A studies the treatment eects for positively vs. negatively framed reminders. Panel B compares
responses to treatments with male vs. female postcard covers. All specications are estimated with linear
probability models and include a constant term. Column 2 and 5 include the restricted, column 3 and 6
the full set of control variables from Table 2. The table further includes the p-values from Wald tests of the
hypothesis that the coecients dier between the reminders with dierent types of framing. Robust standard
errors, clustered at the household-level, are reported in brackets. ???, ?? and ? indicates signicance at a 1%-,
5%-, and 10%-level, respectively.
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Panel A
Dependent variable: Duration to response Duration to check-up
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Neutral 1.581?? 1.489?? 1.543?? 1.629?? 1.506?? 1.530??
(0.014) (0.032) (0.027) (0.015) (0.041) (0.043)
Pos-Frames 1.353? 1.257 1.306 1.418?? 1.304 1.326
(0.066) (0.165) (0.122) (0.047) (0.131) (0.123)
Neg-Frames 1.399?? 1.305? 1.316? 1.448?? 1.336? 1.307
(0.037) (0.099) (0.100) (0.031) (0.093) (0.129)
Wald-Tests (p-Values):
Neutral = Pos 0.303 0.257 0.298 0.385 0.363 0.398
Neutral = Neg 0.419 0.376 0.324 0.448 0.438 0.344
Pos = Neg 0.781 0.760 0.955 0.870 0.848 0.915
Wave dummies no yes yes no yes yes
Controls no yesi yesii no yesi yesii
N 1,227 1,227 1,095 1,227 1,227 1,095
Panel B
Dependent variable: Duration to response Duration to check-up
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Neutral 1.581?? 1.487?? 1.542?? 1.629?? 1.504?? 1.528??
(0.014) (0.032) (0.027) (0.015) (0.042) (0.043)
F-Frames 1.492?? 1.374?? 1.419?? 1.613??? 1.466?? 1.473??
(0.012) (0.049) (0.039) (0.005) (0.026) (0.029)
M-Frames 1.268 1.190 1.205 1.266 1.178 1.160
(0.154) (0.291) (0.277) (0.190) (0.359) (0.420)
Wald-Tests (p-Values):
Neutral = F 0.699 0.590 0.594 0.949 0.866 0.818
Neutral = M 0.155 0.146 0.136 0.125 0.136 0.118
F = M 0.186 0.246 0.205 0.064 0.094 0.082
Wave dummies no yes yes no yes yes
Controls no yesi yesii no yesi yesii
N 1,227 1,227 1,095 1,227 1,227 1,095
Table A.4: Duration analysis (Cox proportional hazard model) { alternative specications
Panel A studies the treatment eects for positively vs. negatively framed reminders. Panel B compares
responses to treatments with male vs. female postcard covers. The table reports hazard ratios from estimations
based on Cox proportional hazards model of responses and check-up attendance up to 100 days after the
treatment intervention. p-values based on robust standard errors, clustered at the household-level, are reported
in parentheses. The table further includes the p-values from Wald tests of the hypothesis that the hazard ratios
dier between the dierent types of reminders. Specication (4) and (5) include the (i) restricted and (ii)
the full set of control variables, respectively. ???, ?? and ? indicates signicance at a 1%-, 5%- and 10%-level,
respectively.
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